The Role of the Batlle General and Acquafredda Castle in Late 14th Century Regnum Sardiniae by Cioppi, Alessandra
287 Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, IX (2015): 287-303 / ISSN 1888-3931 / DOI 10.21001/itma.2015.9.13
THE ROLE OF THE BATLLE GENERAL 
AND ACQUAFREDDA CASTLE IN LATE 
14TH CENTURY REGNUM SARDINIAE
AlessAndRA cioPPi
istituto di stoRiA dell’euRoPA mediteRRAneA
(consiglio nAzionAle delle RiceRche)
itAly
Date of receipt: 13rd of May, 2014
Final date of acceptance: 19th of May, 2015
abstract
The present study analyzes the defense and supplies to Acquafredda the Catalan-
Aragonese fortress in southern Sardinia survived in the end of the fourteenth 
century to the attacks of the troops Arborea. Crucial in this context is the role 
assumed by the general batlle Regnum Sardiniae, whose institutional prerogatives 
of director and head of the royal heritage mix up with political, management and 
defense functions of the Sardinian-Catalan kingdom, on the edge of collapse.1
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caPItalIa Verba
Castellum Acquae Frigidae, Commeatus et Morimem, Saeculum XIV, Corona 
Aragonum, Regnum Sardiniae.
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The aim of this study is to examine the vicissitudes of Acquafredda castle, one of 
the Catalan-Aragonese Regnum Sardiniae’s southernmost fortresses, in order to add 
a further piece to the complex mosaic of the Sardinian-Catalan kingdom’s defensive 
organisation in the late 14th 1century.2
Whilst it is territorially limited and chronologically specific, an overview of the 
castle’s history enables the historic context of which it is part to be better identified 
and evaluated. This essay will concentrate on the more concrete and domestic aspects 
of its everyday affairs throwing lights on elements, situations and customs which 
highlight the experiential character of its history and —interpreting the silence of 
the sources on the subject— contribute to our understanding and reconstruction of 
living conditions in medieval castles.
The documentary material at the heart of this essay is kept at the Archivo General 
de la Corona de Aragón in Barcelona and is made up of three account books which, 
Jordi de Planella compiled as a record of the expenses incurred in supplying and 
defending the surviving southern Sardinian Catalan-Aragonese castles including 
the Acquafredda fortress in his capacity as Sardinian batlle general.3 To carry out his 
duties de Planella had extraordinary funds at his disposal which were issued with 
huge difficulty by Aragon in a last ditch attempt to safeguard its Sardinian kingdom 
across the seas which, at the turn of the 14th century, was now on the verge of 
collapse.4
1. The batlle general case study in the Regnum Sardiniae
In the Crown of Aragon’s states, the battlia general was an institution whose 
activities and influence were truly extraordinary not only in terms of the great 
importance and dignity of the role itself but also as a result of the myriad contacts 
which had to be kept up constantly with functionaries, aristocrats, influential 
individuals and, at the same time, ordinary people, the authority which it succeeded 
in exerting over these, the many contexts in which it was authorised to intervene 
and, above all, for the ongoing and fundamentally important relations which it kept 
up with the king.
The main duties of the batlle general were to administer the royal patrimony for 
which purpose taxes were raised taxes, civil and criminal jurisdiction exerted in a 
very wide range of contexts and feudal and trading duties performed. His sphere 
of competence also included matters relating to fairs and markets, mills and public 
1. Used abbreviations: ACA, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón; ASCa, Archivio di Stato di Cagliari.
2. Cioppi, Alessandra. Le strategie dell’invincibilità. Corona d’Aragona e Regnum Sardiniae nella seconda metà 
del Trecento. Cagliari: Istituto di Storia dell'Europa Mediterranea (Consiglio Nazionale delle Richerche)-
AM&D Edizioni, 2012: 147-158. 
3. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2484, 2485, 2486.
4. On the events of the great Sardinian-Iberian conflict, see Casula, Francesco Cesare. La Sardegna
aragonese. 1. La Corona d’Aragona, 2. La Nazione Sarda. Sassari: Chiarella, 1990.
Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, ix (2015): 287-303 / issn 1888-3931 / doi 10.21001/itma.2015.9.13 
289The role of The Batlle General and acquafredda casTle
water, customs and vacant goods, booty and goods acquired from shipwrecks, and 
importing and exporting goods.5 In the performance of his duties, especially those 
relating to the royal patrimony and taxation, a fiscal prefect worked alongside him 
and —despite the eminence of his role— his financial management was subject to 
the supervision of the Magistrorum Rationarum.
The office of batllia general, unknown in Sardinia but well established as early as 
the 13th century in the Crown of Aragon’s other states, was set up in Sardinia by 
King John I and given the task of administrating the royal patrimony on the island in 
full autonomy and raising revenues for the severely compromised royal finances.6 
The King had, in fact, taken note of the negligence and incompetence of the royal 
functionaries who he blamed for a financial collapse that meant that the kingdom’s 
finances were no longer sufficient to pay even its urgent necessities let alone to 
ensure the defence of its Sardinian territories.7 However, whilst misappropriation 
of funds by officials was common practice and palpable, it was not the only cause 
of the financial crisis of a kingdom which underwent one of the most complex 
and delicate in its history from the late 14th to the early 15th centuries not only in 
the Regnum Sardiniae but in all crown territories. A virtually permanent state of 
war was the central feature of the Aragon crown’s conflictive internal and external 
relations and the immense military expenses required on various fronts prompted 
the Catalan kings to progressively greater alienation of their patrimony.8
5. On the role of the batlle general: Aragó, Antonio Maria. “La Institución Baiulus regis en Cataluña en
la época de Alfonso el Casto”, VII Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón (Barcelona, 1-6 octubre 1962) 
Comunicaciones. Barcelona: Vídua de Fidel Rodríguez, 1962: III, 137-142; Montagut, Tomàs de. “El batlle 
general de Catalunya”. Hacienda Pública Española, 87 (1984): 73-84; García de Valdeavellano, Luis. Curso 
de historia de las istituciones españolas. De los orígenes al final de la Edad Media. Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista 
de Occidente, 1968: 516-517. About the batlle general in Valencia: Piles, Leopoldo. Estudio documental sobre 
el bayle general de Valencia, su autoridad y jurisdicción. Valencia: Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo-Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1970; Guinot, Enric. “La batllia general de València: gestors i 
beneficiaris”, Col·loqui Corona, Municipis i Fiscalitat a la Baixa Edat Mitjana, Manuel Sánchez, Antoni 
Furió, eds. Lleida: Intitut d’Estudis Ilerdencs, 1997: 577-601. About batlle general in Catalonia: Sánchez, 
Manuel. “Batlle”, Diccionari d’Història de Catalunya, Jesús Mestre, Josep Maria Salrach, Josep Termes, eds. 
Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1992: 111. Note that it was only with the Decrets de Nova Planta (1707-1716) 
that the institution of the batllia general was dismantled in the Iberian Peninsula and his duties passed to 
the Intendencia.
6. John I attempted to exert greater control over the management of public offices in order to limit
misappropriation. See ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1939, f. 173; Casula, Francesco Cesare. Carte reali diplomatiche 
di Giovanni I il Cacciatore, re d’Aragona, riguardanti l’Italia. Padova: CEDAM, 1977: 65 (doc. No. 36), 151 
(doc. No. 129), 159 (doc. No. 135).
7. A reading of the documents of the era make clear that not only did royal officials not respect the king’s 
orders but they also frequently pursued their own private interests. See Casula, Francesco Cesare. Carte 
Reali Diplomatiche...: 65 (doc. No. 36), 151 (doc. No. 129), 159 (doc. No. 135) and ACA. Cancillería, reg. 
1939, f. 173r.
8. Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “El patrimoni reial i la recuperació dels senyorius jurisdiccionals en els estats
catalano-aragonesos a la fi del segle XIV”. Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 7 (1970-1971), 351-491: 
351-353 and ther final balance sheets relating to the years of patrimonial sales; Sánchez, Manuel. “La 
fiscalidad real en Catalunya (siglo XIV)”. Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 22 (1992): 341-376; Guinot, 
Enric. “El Patrimoni Reial al País Valencià a inicis del segle XV”. Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 22 (1992): 
581-655; Sánchez, Manuel. El naixement de la fiscalitat d’Estat a Catalunya. Girona: Eumo Editorial, 1995: 
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Specifically as far as the increasingly complex Sardinian question resulting from 
its state of ongoing war with the Giudicato of Arborea was concerned, King Peter IV 
had been attempting to overhaul the founding principles of the island’s government 
for some time.9 He had made his presence felt on various occasions in this matter 
often on explicit request of the island’s governors, bringing previously issued orders 
to their attention and issuing new ones on matters relating to royal administration 
and, in particular, on officials’ salaries and duties.10
Despite this, when his son John succeeded him to the throne in 1387 the gravity 
of the situation forced the new king to take a more thoroughgoing and astute 
approach to the revenue issue.11 At this challenging juncture, it would appear that 
the king channelled all his expectations into the establishment of the batllia general, 
entrusting the kingdom’s financial management to a single individual with wide 
supervisory powers in the hope that this would increase the effectiveness of the 
crown’s financial controls.12 Having abolished the two Capo di Cagliari e Gallura 
and Capo di Logudoro administrations, John I created a new office whose duties 
were to encompass not only the prerogatives of its original institutional function 
107-134; Sánchez, Manuel. Pagar al rey en la Corona de Aragón durante el s. XIV. Barcelona: Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Institución Milá y Fontanals, 2003; Ortí, Pere. Corts, Parlaments 
i fiscalitat a Catalunya: els capítols del donatiu (1288-1384). Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1997: 71-
87; Mira, Antonio José. Entre la renta y el impuesto. Fiscalidad, finanzas y crecimiento económicos en la villas 
reales del sur valencianos (siglos XIV-XVI). Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2005; López, 
José Francisco. “Para una historia fiscal de la Mallorca cristiana (siglos XIII-XIV)”. Anuario de Estudios 
Medievales, 38/1 (enero-junio 2008): 101-184; Sabaté, Flocel. “L’augment de l’exigència fiscal en els 
municipis catalans al segle XIV: elements de pressió i de resposta”, Col·loqui Corona, Municipis i Fiscalitat a 
la Baixa Edat Mitjana, Manuel Sánchez, Antoni Furió, eds. Lleida: Intitut d’Estudis Ilerdencs, 1997: 423-
465 and all the essays in this miscellaneous volume. 
9. Corruption amongst crown functionaries was already endemic in Peter IV’s reign. See Cort general
de Montsó (1382-1384), Ignasi Baiges, Anna Rubió, Elisa Varela, eds. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 
1992: 219-242.
10. Peter IV had already in 1352, prompted by the kingdom’s general governor Rambau de Corbera,
approved most of the latter’s chapters issued as a result of his orders relating to a more detailed 
redistribution of salaries and a more appropriate re-organisation of public offices. See Arienzo, Luisa. 
Carte reali diplomatiche di Pietro IV il Cerimonioso, re d’Aragona, riguardanti l’Italia. Padova: CEDAM, 1970: 
192 (doc. No. 377), 193 (doc. No. 193); Costa, Mercè. “Oficials de Pere el Cerimonios a Sasser (1336-
1387)”, La Sardegna nel mondo mediterraneo. 2. Gli aspetti storici, Atti del primo Convegno internazionale di studi 
geografico-storici (Sassari, 7-9 aprile 1978), Manlio Brigaglia, ed. Sassari: Gallizzi, 1981: 291-314 and Costa, 
Maria Mercè. “Oficials de la Corona d’Aragó a Sardenya (segle XIV). Notes biogràfiques”. Archivio Storico 
Sardo, 29 (1964): 340-343. On Peter IV’s actions compare with Era, Antonio. L’ordinamento organico di 
Pietro IV d’Aragona per i territori del Cagliaritano. Sassari: Gallizzi, 1933: 1-78.
11. The original text is ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1939, f. 145-147v. The expenses amounted to such an
enormous sum that the incomes deriving from revenues and the island’s royal taxation together were 
not sufficient to cover it. In general terms, John I’s pragmatic reproposed the reorganisation orders 
relating to the Cagliari offices issued thirty-five years earlier by Peter IV. See Era, Antonio. L’ordinamento 
organico...: 15-52; Ferrer, M. Teresa. “El patrimoni reial...”: 351-491. 
12. For the establishment of the Kingdom of Sardinia’s batlle general, see ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1939, f.
171 and on the subject of the factors prompting the establishment of this office in the Sardinian kingdom 
see Ferrante, Carla. “L’istituzione del bailo generale nel regno di Sardegna (1391-1401)”, El poder real 
en la Corona de Aragón (siglos XIV-XVI), XV Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón (Jaca, 20-25 septiembre 
1993). Saragossa: Diputación General de Aragón, 1996): I/3, 93-109. 
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but also those of the two general governments of Sardinia and other jurisdictional 
functions.13
Despite these intentions, the batllia institution lasted only a relatively short time 
on the island. Martin I succeeded his brother John I in 1396 and abolished it in 
1401 considering it incapable of governing the kingdom and raising the kingdom’s 
revenues.14 In its place, he reinstated the office of general administrator and the 
two Capo di Cagliari e di Gallura and Capo di Logudoro governorates established 
by Peter IV.15
This change of direction, however, was not equally long lasting. The issues which 
had prompted the crown to set up the battlia institution in the Sardinian kingdom 
remained unresolved in the first decade of the century which followed precisely 
because its state of permanent war was also unresolved. It was only later, in 1413, 
during the reign of Ferdinand I and a climate of well-established peace on the island, 
that the important and effective measures that definitively settled the issue were 
put into practice.16 The two general administrations were once again abolished and 
replaced with a new, single patrimonial institution, the royal prefecture.17
The establishment of the Sardinian kingdom’s batllia general was thus made 
official in February 1391 when John I appointed Berenguer Xicot to the office in a 
cartha commissionis.18 Five months later the appointment passed to Jordi de Planella, 
an eminent figure well known at court, whose activities were encompassed within 
and interwoven into the island’s political-economic fabric from this moment on.19
13. The abolition of the two posts of general administrator appears in ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1939, f.
171r. On the duties of the Sardinian batlle general, see charta commissionis in ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1939, 
ff. 166v-168r; Cioppi, Alessandra. Le strategie dell’invincibilità...: 201-229.
14. On the brief life of the Sardinian batllia general, ACA. Cancillería, reg. 2226, ff. 167v-169r; ff.
181v-183v; Boscolo, Alberto. La politica italiana di Martino il Vecchio re d’Aragona. Padua: CEDAM, 1962: 
77-80; Olla Repetto, Gabriella. “L’Istituto del «Procurator Regius Regni Sardiniae» sotto Alfonso il 
Magnanimo”, La Corona d’Aragona e il Mediterraneo: aspetti e problemi comuni da Alfonso il Magnanimo a 
Ferdinando il Cattolico (1416-1516), IX Congresso di Storia della Corona d’Aragona (Napoli, 11-15 aprile 1973). 
Naples: Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, 1982: II, 135-145. As well as the single office of the batlle 
general —which was generally considered ineffective— an attempt to unify the kingdom had also been 
made in 1387, once again by John I, when he created the office of treasury lieutenant of Aragon, another 
ultra short-lived institution. For a more in-depth study, see Tore, Gianfranco. “Il documento istitutivo 
dell’ufficio di luogotenente del tesoriere d’Aragona nel ’Regno di Sardegna’ (1387)”. Archivio Storico 
Sardo, 34. (1983): 111-123 and Olla Repetto, Gabriella. “L’Istituto del Procurator Regius...”: 135. 
15. ASCa. Antico Archivio Regio, B6, ff. 265r-268r.
16. Meloni, Giuseppe; Simbula, Pinuccia Franca. “Demografia e fiscalità nei territori regi del regno di
Sardegna al principio del XV secolo”, El poder real en la Corona de Aragón...: I/3, 155-188.
17. ASCa. Antico Archivio Regio, B6, ff. 265-267. On the establishment of the Sardinian royal prefecture 
and the roles and importance of this office, see Olla Repetto, Gabriella. Il primo “liber curiae” della 
Procurazione reale di Sardegna (1413-1425). Rome: Ministero dell’Interno, 1974: 3-76 (Fonti e Sussidi. 
Pubblicazione degli Archivi di Stato. Archivio di Stato di Cagliari, V); Olla Repetto, Gabriella. “L’istituto 
del Procurator Regius...”: 136.
18. On the appointment of Berenguer Xicot, see ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1939, ff. 166v-168r; Ferrante,
Carla. “L’istituzione del bailo generale...”: 93-109.
19. The reasons for this passage from one royal mandate to another are still unclear today. Carla
Ferrante (Ferrante, Carla. “L’istituzione del bailo...”: 105) refers to the news of the replacement of Xicot 
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The continual state of war and the limits on royal power, conflicts of interest 
and political pressure at the local level, meant that in pratice Planella acquired 
administrative, political and military duties which profoundly modified the 
office itself, its institutional functions and the nomination and distribution of his 
jurisdiction.
On this matter, the Barcelona archives provide us with interesting data with 
which to reconstruct the more practical aspects of his endeavours in the Regnum 
Sardinae too. These saw him frequently involved in extraordinary activities aimed at 
safeguarding and recovering the Sardinian kingdom rather than simply the normal 
exercise of the duties and functions of the batlle general. In the three years from 1396 
to 1399, in fact, assisted by other royal offices, Planella administered extraordinary 
revenues which involved the allocation of a large sum of money —15,050 Aragon 
gold florins— over three years20 for the purpose of the island’s defence. 
An accurate account of this financial plan drawn up by the batlle has survived and 
shows this royal official accounting for his work. It is this which will be examined 
here. Each annual allocation of funds corresponded to an account book which 
notes all incoming and outgoing expense items subdivided into chapters. Original 
payment acts were attached as well as the receipts issued by the beneficiaries of the 
various expenses, creditors and suppliers of goods and services showing not only 
the truth of his accounts but also the effective necessity of the costs incurred.21
The contents of the account books goes well beyond purely local concerns and 
can thus provide an insight into some aspects of the problems encountered in the 
active and passive defence of Catalan-Aragonese Sardinia in the second half of the 
14th century. Already at the end of Peter IV’s reign, an extremely critical situation 
resulting from insistent and violent struggles with the Giudicato of Arborea had 
impacted seriously on Aragonese politics and the actions of the crown in favour of 
a suitable defence of the Regnum Sardinae. The references in the account books to 
Planella batlle have supplied new and interesting elements to analyse which have 
enriched the academic debate and provided insights into the cost of war in the 
Sardinian kingdom in the last few years of the 14th century when, despite the best 
efforts of the Catalan monarchy, the stubborn, centuries’ long resistance of the 
Sardinians across the seas risked dragging Aragon into total disarray.
by Jordi de Planella allo Xicot but reports that she found no mention of the appointment of the latter. The 
decree or charta commissionis (31st July 1391) with which Planella was nominated batlle has, on the other 
hand, been found in the Barcelona archive by Alessandra Cioppi. See Cioppi, Alessandra. Le strategie 
dell’invincibilità...: 217 and ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1940, ff. 79v-82v. 
20. On the 29th of May 1396, the general administrators for the defence of Sardinia, Francesch Foix and 
Felip de Ferrera, entrusted Jordi de Planella with managing funds for the defence of the last surviving 
Catalan-Aragonese strongholds in the south of the island on the king’s orders. See ACA. Real Patrimonio. 
Maestro Racional, reg. 2484 (1396-1397), f. 1; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2485 
(1397-1398), f. 1r; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2486 (1398-1399), f. 1r. 
21. Each recorded reebudes and dates is accompanied by a carta debitoria or anàpocha, autenticated by 
interested parties in the presence of a notary —always Guillelm Casanova who worked at the time in 
Castell de Càller. 
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In particular, they allow for a reconstruction of the management of the castles 
which were still in Iberian hands and the financial costs involved in organising 
and defending them to the extent that the Catalan kings never gave up the idea 
of bringing the ’Sardinian question’ to a definitive close. Above all the expense 
items relating to the three fortresses subject to extraordinary intervention are listed 
in minute detail. Castell de Càller, the capital of the kingdom —in serious jeopardy 
despite its imposing walls and fortifications; San Michele— irreplaceable outpost in 
the direction of the Cagliari hinterland and the Campidani; Acquafredda, bulwark 
of the vast Sigerro curatoria on the border with the Sulcis-Iglesiente mining region.
In particular, as far as this latter is concerned, the information contained in the 
batlle general documents provides abundant sources of useful material in tracing, 
however generally, the vicissitudes of this important fortress.
2. A Sardinian stronghold case study: Acquafredda
Acquafredda castle was built as a fortress in the Giudicato period, experienced in 
embryonic terms the socio-economic impulse of Pisan influence in the 13th and 14th 
centuries before going to the Tuscan Gherardesca family —the Donoratico counts— 
and then passing into the hands of Count Ugolino according to the most creditable 
accounts. The latter was the Ugolino who dominated the southernmost third of the 
former Cagliari giudicato with his brother Gherardo after the Pisan victory over the 
Genoese in 1258 and was imprisoned in the Torre della Fame by the Pisa comune 
before being placed by Dante in his innermost circles of hell.22
The functions of a fortress which was very probably built for the purposes of 
mining management were essentially military and it was lived in prevalently by the 
soldiers given the task of defending this vast area with its great many silver and lead 
mines. Equipped with an external ring of walls —nowadays mainly ruined— the 
castle itself consisted of two outlying and one central tower, the so-called mastio 
(keep) whose last-ditch defence it was designed for. Joined together by battlemented 
stone bridges, the towers were equipped with machicolations, crossbow loops and 
squared off battlements which defended several buildings for specific uses: lodgings, 
warehouses, sheds and, above all, the water cisterns.23 
22. On Count Ugolino della Gherardesca, Count of Donoratico (Dante Alighieri, Divina Commedia, Inferno, 
c. XXXIII) and the members of his family involved in the Sardinian events, see Genealogie medioevali di 
Sardegna, Lindsay L. Brook, Francesco Cesare Casula, eds. Sassari: 2D Editrice Mediterranea, 1984: XI-
XIII, 232-249; Toscanelli, Nello. I conti di Donoratico della Gherardesca, signori di Pisa. Pisa: Nistri-Lischi, 1937 
e Tangheroni, Marco. La città dell’argento. Iglesias dalle origini alla fine del Medioevo. Naples: Liguori, 1985.
23. Fois, Foiso. “Il castello di Acquafredda di Siliqua. Contributo alla storia delle fortificazioni in 
Sardegna”. Studi Sardi, 17 (1959-1961): 441-461; Coroneo, Roberto. Architettura Romenica dalla metà del 
Mille al primo ’300. Nuoro: Ilisso, 1993: 289 and the volume. Il castello di Acquafredda. Note di storia e 
archeologia, Donatella Salvi, Ilaria Garbi, ed. Settimo Milanese: RTP Castelli di Sardegna-Soprintendenza 
Archeologica per le provv. di Cagliari e Oristano, 2010: 18-36.
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After the Catalan-Aragonese conquest of the island, the fort passed directly under 
the control of the royal government as it was considered by Alfonso of Aragone to 
be a magnae fortitudinis.24 A castellan was appointed for this purpose and entrusted 
with the task of safeguarding the castle and the whole fortified settlement made 
up of a small network of neighbouring villages. Over time, this post became much 
sought after and extremely profitable as the appointment related to the command 
and defence of the fortress and control of the area around it. The duties of the 
castellan, in fact, included praeses functions in relation to the people resident in 
the castle and the hamlets both military or civilian and was he was responsible for 
managing an annual budget —the retinençia— which was to cover his own pay,25 
ordinary building maintenance and supply costs, the salaries of a considerable 
number of mercenaries under his command and, lastly, the salaries of the guards 
—the servents— who ensured the defence of the fortress itself.26
From 1334 to 1360, a number of eminent, high status figures were appointed 
castellan such as Napoleó and James of Aragon, King John II’s illegitimate sons, 
Nicolau de Libiá and Amorós de Ribelles, both brothers of the realm’s governor 
general, Ramon d’Empuries, Alegrança’s husband and favourite nephew and heir 
of James of Aragon and Dalmazzo de Jardí, future vicar of Alghero and governor 
general of Capo di Logudoro.27
The war of liberation which the Giudicato of Arborea fought against Aragon, 
above all from the latter half of the 14th century onwards,28 obliged the latter to 
maintain its castles in a state of military preparedness and thus these only benefitted 
from feudal rights at the beginning of the period of domination and for a short 
time.29 The bloody wars which Sardinia was subject to from the early decades of the 
15th century led to a necessary return to ancient and virtually exclusively military 
24. Simbula, Pinuccia Franca. “Il castello di Acquafredda: appunti sulla vita quotidiana in una fortezza 
sarda nel Trecento”. Quaderni bolotanesi, 18 (1992): 265-299.
25. The castellan’s income was 5000 soldi on average with values extremes ranging from 2,000 to 16,000 
soldi di alfonsini minuti. See ASCa. Procurazione Reale, B6, f. 51, f. 78v, f. 92r, f. 125r; and Simbula, Pinuccia 
Franca. “Il castello di Acquafredda...”: 272. 
26. For the castellan’s duties, see Tangheroni, Marco. La città dell’argento...: 236-246; Olla Repetto, 
Gabriella. Gli ufficiali regi di Sardegna durante il regno di Alfonso IV. Cagliari: Fossataro, 1969: 44-45; Era, 
Antonio. L’ordinamento organico...: 30, 41-42, 72-73.
27. Costa, Maria Mercè. “Oficials de la Corona d’Aragó a Sardenya (segle XIV). Notes biogràfiques”. 
Archivio Storico Sardo, 29 (1964): 325-327, 363-369, 373-377. Napoleó de Aragó, born of Gerolda, wife 
of aristocrat Gualtiero Campagna di Mileto and concubine of King John II (Casula, Francesco Cesare. 
La Sardegna aragonese...: II, 366) was Jaume’s half-brother and like him illegitimate son of the King of 
Aragon and a certain Sicilian woman who later married Vanno de Bonavita. See Genealogie medioevali di 
Sardegna: XL, 456-457. Amorós de Ribelles was, on the other hand, a member of the Ramon de Ribelles 
family, trusted counsellor of Infante Alfonso and governor general of the Sardinian kingdom from 1337 
onwards. Nicolau de Libiá was probably Pere’s brother and the latter was later governor general of the 
island (Tangheroni, Marco. La città dell’argento...: 284). 
28. For a detailed account of events, see Casula, Francesco Cesare. La Sardegna aragonese...: II, 365-412; 
Anatra, Bruno. “Dall’unificazione aragonese ai Savoia”, La Sardegna medioevale e moderna. Storia d’Italia. X, 
John Day, Bruno Anatra, Lucetta Scaraffia, eds. Turin: UTET, 1984: 189-663 (191-364).
29. Tangheroni, Marco. “Il ’Regnum Sardiniae et Corsicae’ nell’espansione mediterranea della Corona 
d’Aragona. Aspetti economici”, La Corona d’Aragona in Italia (secc. XIII-XVIII), XIV Congresso di Storia della 
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roles for castles and annihilated any ambitions to make these a source of income or 
grants reducing them to harsh front line outposts which were frequently attacked, 
sieged and struggling for survival. Static war thus played a hugely important role 
as a military tactic in Sardinia not only during the conquest itself but above all 
in preserving the kingdom from the mid 14th to the early 15th centuries.30 In the 
absence of the resources required to maintain its overseas possession stably in the 
context of the financial difficulties it was experiencing, the Aragon monarchy was 
forced to resort to this type of conflict however difficult to manage and source of 
continual conflicts and contradictions.31 When hostilities with the Giudicato of 
Arborea ceased and the feudal rebellion led by the Marquises of Oristano at the 
end of the 15th century was crushed, the Aragon crown had no further need for 
these expensive fortified buildings. The great castle building period thus came to 
an end and almost all the Sardinian fortresses which had played such an important 
Corona d’Aragona (Sassari-Alghero, 19-24 maggio 1990). Sassari: Carlo Delfino Editore, 1993: I, 49-88; 
Tangheroni, Marco. La città dell’argento...: 282-284.
30. The importance that this type of conflict has played in Sardinian history is the subject of a study by 
Maria Teresa Ferrer Mallol. Whilst designed to highlight the ’Catalan aspect’ of the issue her analysis is 
certainly the most extensive and best documented.
31. Ferrer, Maria Teresa. El patrimoni reial...: 351-491; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. Organització i defensa d’un 
territori fronterer. La governació d’Oriola en el segle XIV. Barcelona: CSIC, 1990; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. 
“Barcelona i la politica mediterrània catalana: el Parlament de 1400-1401”, La Corona d’Aragona in 
Italia...: II/1, 427-443; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “La guerra d’Arborea alla fine del XIV secolo”, Giudicato 
d’Arborea e Marchesato di Oristano: proiezioni mediterranee e aspetti di storia locale, 1° Convegno Internazionale 
di Studi (Oristano, 5-8 dicembre 1997), Gimpaolo Mele, coord. Oristano: ISTAR, 2000: 2/1, 535-620; Ferrer, 
Maria Teresa. “La organización militar de Cataluña en la Edad Media”, Conquistar y defender. Los recursos 
militares en la Edad Media hispánica, Miguel Ángel Ladero, coord. Revista de Historia Militar, 45 (2001): 
119-222. Alongside Ferrer’s studies are those of: Sáiz, Jorge. Guerra y nobleza en la Corona de Aragón. 
La caballeria en los ejércitos del Rey (siglos XIV-XV). Valencia: Servei de Publicacions de la Universitat de 
València, 2003 and Sáiz, Jorge. “La organización militar en la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de 
Aragón, siglos XIV y XV”, La Mediterrània de la Corona d’Aragó, segles XIII-XVI & VII Centenari de la sentència 
arbitral de Torrellas, 1304-2004, Actes XVIII Congrés Internacional d’Història de la Corona d’Aragó (València, 9-14 
setembre 2004). Valencia: Universitat de València, 2005: I, 737-764; Hernández, Francesc Xavier. Historia 
militar de Catalunya. Aproximació didáctica. Barcelona: Dalmau, 2004; Bertran, Prim. “La nobleza catalana 
y la guerra de Cerdeña de 1354. La expedición de 1354”. Hidalguía, 46/271 (1998): 737-755; Orsi, Mario. 
“Estrategia, operaciones y logística en un conflicto mediterráneo. La revuelta del juez de Arborea y la 
“armada e viatge” de Pedro el Ceremonioso a Cerdeña (1353-1354)”. Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 38/2 
(2008): 921-968. Of fundamental importance to this research though referring to the Iberian area, see 
Cabanes, Maria Desamparados. “Los castillos de frontera en el reino de Valencia”. Estudios de la Edad 
Media de la Corona de Aragón, 10 (1975): 653-669; Martínez, Luis Pablo. “La historia militar del reino 
medieval de Valencia: balance y perspectivas”. Militaria. Revista de cultura militar, 11 (1998): 29-75; Sesma, 
José Ángel. “Guerra, ejército y sociedad en los reinos de Aragón y Navarra en la Edad Media”. Revista de 
Historia Militar, 1 (2002): 13-48; García, Juan Vicente. “El mantenimiento de los recintos fortificados en la 
Valencia bajomedieval. Las reparaciones del castillo de Xátiva (1410-1412)”. Acta historica et archaeologica 
Mediaevalia, 18 (1997): 475-493; García, Juan Vicente “Las obras que nunca se acaban. El mantenimiento 
de los castillos en la Valencia medieval: sus protagonistas e sus materiales”. Ars longa: cuadernos de arte, 
12 (2003): 7-15; Mitre, Emilio; Alvira, Martín. “Ideología y guerra en los reinos de la España Medieval”, 
Conquistar y defender...: 291-334. 
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part in the island’s political history were now function-less and began to fall into 
inexorable and irreversible wrack and ruin.32
With its key strategic position in the defensive system of the Regnum Sardinae, 
Acquafredda’s functions had always been strictly military in nature and this was all 
the more the case when Arborea declared war on Aragon.
When war broke out after 1350, the stronghold managed to hold out against the 
multitude of attacks launched against it by the Arborea troops and, at the end of the 
14th century, when events had turned to the favour of the Giudicato of Arborea, it 
once again played a key role in the reign’s southern fortifications when it succeeded 
in holding out against ongoing attacks by the soldiers of Brancaleone Doria, 
impatient to invade the Cagliari area and definitively occupy Castell de Càller.33
Reinforcing the fortress’s defences and satisfying its continual supply needs and 
uninterrupted maintenance and repair requirements was thus a pressing concern 
for the Aragonese kings from the latter half of the 14th century onwards. Repairs 
were extremely frequent in the castle’s long military history and the work carried 
out on it in the 14th and early 15th centuries cannot be listed here for reasons of 
space. It will suffice here to mention some of the many requests for action sent to 
the Court and underline the ability of the impregnable Sigerro fortress to resist.
In 1351, for example, King Peter IV himself urged new and indispensable 
renovation work to improve the fortified complex while in 1358, it was the castellan 
Dalmazzo de Jardí who was granted payment for the expenses he had incurred in 
certain modernisation work which he had requested not only for the fortress but 
also for the village around it.34
From April 1365 when the wars with Arborea had flared up and conflict was 
imminent, measures were taken which were to impact on the southern regions of 
the kingdom. The governor general thus ordered that the Sigerro castle should be 
suitably modernised because the castellan’s reports had highlighted a serious food 
supply problem in the event of an attack as well as a lack of the tools, equipment 
and arms required to cope with siege and arm the war machines.
In the months which followed, a resident of Castell de Càller, an expert in 
crossbows surveyed Acquafredda “pro recognoscendis, abtandis et reparandis ballistis 
dictorum castrorum et eorum viratonis impenandis”.35 The next year the fort resisted the 
attacks of the Giudicato troops and the soldiers stationed there pressed for continual 
repairs to its walls and buildings.36
32. Casula, Francesco Cesare. “Castelli e fortezze”, Atlante della Sardegna, Roberto Pracchi, Angela 
Terrosu Asole, Mario Giuseppe Riccardi, eds. Rome: Edizioni Kappa, 1980: II, 109-114 (table 40); Cioppi, 
Alessandra. “I sistemi di difesa nella Sardegna medioevale. Committenze e strategie”, Verso un atlante dei 
sistemi difensivi della Sardegna. Rome: Istituto Italiano dei Castelli, forthcoming. 
33. Casula, Francesco Cesare. La Sardegna aragonese...: II, 393 and 427.
34. Tangheroni, Marco. La città dell’argento...: 328-329 and 350.
35. ASCa. Antico Archivio Regio, K2, f. 73r. In August 1365, the crossbow archer Berenguer Almuzara 
visited Acquafredda and Gioiosaguardia castles to repair their crossbows and fletch their arrows. See 
ASCa. Antico Archivio Regio, K2, f. 82r.
36. ASCa. Antico Archivio Regio, K2, ff. 101v-102r; ff. 107v-109r; ff. 130v-131r.
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It was, however, in the last decade of the 14th century that the situation became 
critical. Having left notions of great expeditions to one side —such proposals 
never left the drawing board— the Catalan-Aragonese defence of Sardinia was 
considerably down-sized and on occasions even precarious. It was a defence that, 
despite its limitations, managed to fulfil its main objective nonetheless— preserving 
the Iberian presence on the island. Whilst this presence was minimal and limited 
to control of a few inland castles and a number of strongholds on the coast it was 
still capable of ensuring Aragon the chance to recover whenever its domestic 
predicament might allow.
From the 1470s onwards, the fortresses which the Regnum Sardinae still 
possessed were actually very few and encircled by hostile territory which left them 
totally isolated with consequent serious supply problems. Local revenues were 
nowhere near enough to pay for the keep of the soldiers manning the fortress and 
the revenues from the Iberian Peninsula fell short as a result of the many other 
ongoing disputes in the continent. Gathering the considerable funds needed to 
pay soldiers and Alcalde and maintain, modernise and supply castles was a not a 
straightforward matter.
In 1396, for example, under pressing and continual threat of attack by Brancaleone 
Doria, work was done on the walls of Acquafredda castle37 and the water cistern 
there repaired in order to guarantee its long-term efficiency.38 This work was made 
possible by the work of a courier, Anthoni Darcedi, who transported the necessary 
material from Castell de Càller to the Sigerro castle. He was escorted by five men and 
Anthoni Scarcello, the owner of a boat in which the party managed to sail up River 
Cixerri from the Santa Igia lagoon to the marshy Uta area, as close as possible to the 
castle in order to avoid ambushes by bands loyal to the Doria family.39
In the first decade of the 15th century, on the other hand, when the war was 
petering out, wall repairs and carpentry work were needed. In the spring of 1407, 
castellan Bernat de Riera went to the extent of a “de gran adob” in the castle 
designed to make its rooms cosier and more comfortable, work that was much 
desired by his wife too.40 To this end, a certain Jacme de Riusech, an Alcúdia native 
living in Castell de Càller, worked for sixty-six days earning the sum of 12 lire and 
37. ASCa. Antico Archivio Regio, K2, ff. 130v-131r.
38. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2484, ff. 23-23v; Cioppi, Alessandra. “I registri di Jordi 
de Planella, ’batlle general’ di Sardegna. Note sull’amministrazione di un ufficiale regio alla fine del XIV 
secolo”, La corona catalanoaragonesa i el seu entorn mediterrani a la baixa edat mitjana, Maria Teresa Ferrer, 
Josefina Mutgé, Manuel Sánchez, eds. Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-
Institució Milà i Fontanals, 2005: 23-63 (46-47).
39. This information comes to us via Jordi de Planella’s account books. For this expedition Anthoni 
Darcedi was paid 1 lira and 14 soldi and for their journey from Castell de Càller to Acquafredda, Anthoni 
Scarcello and his companions received 1 lira and 4 soldi. See ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, 
reg. 2484, ff. 23r-23v.
40. The Acquafredda castellan’s wife, who lived in the castle alongside her husband in accordance with 
the provisions of Peter IV (Era, Antonio. L’ordinamento organico...: 72-74), had very little in common with 
the ideal courtier model and resembled the female roles set out by Gabriella Olla Repetto to a much 
greater extent, Olla Repetto, Gabriella. “La donna cagliaritana tra ’400 e ’600’”. Medioevo. Saggi e Rassegne, 
11 (1986): 171-207. 
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12 soldi di alfonsini minuti. He was aided by an assistant who earned 6 lire and 10 
soldi di alfonsini minuti for fifty-two days of work. This latter was also paid the sum 
of 15 soldi to transport just under three hundred terracotta tiles to be laid as floors 
in a number of rooms to the town in the castle. The ancient castle’s renovation was 
then probably completed with whitewashing, a sign of the renewed faith in it of the 
Catalan-Aragonese crown.41
3. How to defend and supply Acquafredda
The data to be found in the 14th-century archive documents on Acquafredda 
fort —including the information supplied by the batlle general’s account books— are 
almost exclusively administrative in nature and reflect only requirements relating to 
the castle’s functions and defensive potential. They are sectorial and indirect sources 
focusing mainly on soldiers rather than the men at arms and weaponry which were 
part of the fort’s forniment —and as such the crown’s property— as well as the small 
tools needed for repair, basic food supplies and warehouses to store them in.
Despite this, from the starting point of the space calculations and descriptions of 
objects in the sources, life within a Catalan-Aragonese stronghold in 14th-century 
Sardinia can be inferred and retraced.
At times in which the fortress was not directly involved in the war, we learn 
that the castellan’s family could live with him in the residence as required by his 
appointment. In such circumstances, a small retinue of servants suitable to his rank 
populated the castle, enlivening its spaces and alleviating an isolation that must 
have been suffocating at times. The Acquafredda castellans, in fact, frequently 
complained of the state of extreme segregation which the castle forced them to live 
in and some were prompted by a desire to escape continual residence there to give 
up the post. A case in point is Ramon de Ampuries, while his successor Dalmazzo 
de Jardí paid a very high price for his sense of duty to his appointed role. Appointed 
castellan in 1355, he accepted the post and, not wanting to separate himself from 
his loved ones, moved into the castle with both wife and children. Just three years 
later, in 1358, he asked for permission to leave a replacement at the fortress in order 
to stay in Castell de Càller for at least six months a year on the grounds that both he 
and his wife were seriously ill and two of their children had died as a result of the 
terrible sanitary conditions in the castle. King Peter IV granted the request of his 
faithful servant and allowed him to alleviate the harsh conditions of castle life with 
brief visits to town.42
Overall, however, Acquafredda castle must have been well organised and safe. 
Life there was perhaps not always pleasant but their military vocation did not stop 
41. ASCa. Antico Archivo Regio K3, ff. 22r-22v; Fois, Foiso. “Il castello di Acquafredda di Siliqua...”: 446. 
42. Tangheroni, Marco. La città dell’argento...: 284-285; 350.
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its residents from engaging, however marginally, in activities which were mainly 
possible in the absence of specific military threats.
The inhabitants of the fortress, in fact, engaged in hunting within its walls, carried 
out small maintenance tasks, cleaned and checked the weaponry, reorganised the 
warehouse and the tools. They stored away non-perishable material supplies.43 
They made dough and baked bread.
In this respect, an inventory of castle goods delivered to aristocrat Amorós de 
Ribelles, Acquafredda castellan in October 1338, shows that there were two mills 
inside the castle one of which was mule and the other horse-powered. A second 
inventory drawn up by castellan Ramon de Ampuries and passed on to his successor 
Dalmazzo de Jardí in July 1355 mentions a further two mills in the castle keep which 
were called “sardeschi” by the scribe.44 To these, two further grindstones were added 
only one of which was complete and in working order.45 A striking detail which 
emerges from these inventories is the diversity in mill types in the castle which was 
underlined by its castellans. The use of the ’sardesco’ adjective implies the existence 
of a specific machine that must have been very small as it was kept inside a single 
room in the castle. Perhaps this was an ancient wheat grindstone like those which 
had been in use on the island since Roman times, consisting of a few stone, donkey-
powered elements of a type which has survived unchanged to our own times in the 
millstones visible in the courtyards of farm houses.46
When possible, the presence of the castellan’s wife certainly made life inside the 
castle more comfortable. Whilst she was capable of overseeing a range of tasks, 
her main duties were traditionally female ones. The various canes of canvas which 
reached Acquafredda, for example, had to be sewn and embroidered with the help 
of the village serventa to make napkins and simple garments as was customary in the 
European castles of the day.47
The castellan’s wife was also responsible for salting meat and fish and eels in 
particular.48 Her tasks included overseeing bread and biscuit making for the whole 
43. ACA. Papeles para incorporar. Caja 24, ff. 1v-3r; ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1027, ff. 65v-67r; ACA. Real 
Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2484, ff. 21v-22r; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 
2485, ff. 29v-31r; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2486, ff. 29-30r.
44. The descriptions of objects listed in the 1338 (ACA. Papeles para incorporar, n. 24, ff. 1v-3) and 1355 
inventories (ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1027, ff. 65v-67r) give an idea of the way Acquafredda castle was 
organised and the nature of its resident community subject to continual demands for work, renovation 
and defence. The text of the 1388 inventory is in Simbula, Pinuccia Franca. “Il castello di Acquafredda...”: 
291-299; the text of 1355 is edited in Fois, Foiso. “Il castello di Acquafredda di Siliqua...”: 455-460.
45. ACA. Papeles para incorporar, caja 24 (1338, 15 ottobre), ff. 1r-6r; ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1027, ff. 
65v-67r.
46. This agricultural machinery has been studied and described by Fois, Barbara. Territorio e paesaggio 
agrario nella Sardegna medioevale. Pisa: ETS, 1990: 115-121. 
47. ASCa. Antico Achivio Real, K3, ff. 22r-22v; ff. 25r-25v; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, 
reg. 2092, f. 124v; Power, Eileen. Donne nel Medioevo, Michael Moissey, ed., Sciana Loaldi Contri, trad. 
Milan: Jaca Book, 1999: 54-55; Duby, George; Perrot, Michélle. “Il modello cortese”, Storia delle donne. 2. 
Il Medioevo, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, ed., Liliana Lanzarini, trad. Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1990: 310-329.
48. Manca, Ciro. Aspetti dell’espansione economica catalano-aragonese nel Mediterraneo occidentale. Il commercio 
del sale. Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 1965: 33-46 (35).
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community. The wheat for the castle’s consumption was ground in the mills within 
the walls, which was then sifted with garbells and, lastly, large quantities of bread 
and biscuits were made with the help of all the servents and a few serventa.
Other aspects of castle life are more difficult to establish. It is impossible to 
calculate the number of people whose lives revolved around the castle. We certainly 
know the size of the military garrison with considerable accuracy and the extent 
to which this varied over the months and we can also estimate the considerable 
number of men working in farming in the village and castle and the subsequent 
trading of its produce.49
When sieges or raids made regular supplies of fresh produce from the countryside 
impossible, the fortress was supplied every three/six months with the basic 
foodstuffs, arms and tools indispensable to daily life by means of routes designed to 
evade enemy ambushes. Water courses were frequently made use of as they could 
be navigated by small boats often right up to the base of the castle allowing food 
and weaponry supplies to be delivered and evading Arboria military surveillance.50
Such journeys were almost always accompanied by a military escort and carried 
out by means of horse-drawn carts led by carradors many of whom were native to 
Villanova and Stampace, used to ensuring transport links between Castell de Càller 
and its adjuncts and on exceptional occasions with the Cagliari hinterland as well.51 
The performance of such duties and the costs involved were strictly regulated by 
town laws in the general interests of trade and the community.52
In our case, the batlle registers show that the preferred Acquafredda supply routes 
were rivers via small flat-keeled boats called xius which were particularly suitable 
for this type of transport to inland castles or panescalm (penescalm), faster boats 
with many oars mostly used for goods and passenger transport.53 Food transport 
—much of which came from Catalonia— was organisationally demanding because 
the journey took nine days and was around 50 miles long.54 
Such transport usually required a succession of intermediate stages. The goods 
were generally placed in sacks and barrels inside carts driven by carters. After 
crossing the Santa Gilla pond the route navigated River Cixerri to Sent Veneci before 
continuing briefly overland to Acquafredda castle escorted by a company of more 
49. Tangheroni, Marco. La città dell’argento...: 351-352; Cioppi, Alessandra. Le strategie...: 147-158.
50. Castellaccio, Angelo. “Utilizzazione militare di alcune acque interne nella Sardegna catalano-
aragonese”, La Sardegna nel mondo mediterraneo. 6. Per una storia dell’acqua in Sardegna, Atti del terzo Convegno 
internazionale di studi geografico-storici (Sassari-Porto Cervo-Bono, 10-14 aprile 1985), Manlio Brigaglia, ed. 
Sassari: Gallizzi, 1990: 83-116.
51. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2484, f. 21r; reg. 2485, ff. 31r-31v; ACA. Real 
Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2486, ff. 30v-31r.
52. Pinna, Michele. “Le Ordinazioni dei Consiglieri del Castello di Cagliari del secolo XIV”. Archivio 
Storico Sardo, 17 (1929): 2-272; Manconi, Francesco. Libro delle ordinanze dei Consellers della Città di 
Cagliari (1346-1603). Sassari: Fondazione Banco di Sardegna, 2005.
53. Simbula, Pinuccia Franca. Corsari e pirati nei mari di Sardegna. Cagliari: Istituto sui rapporti italo-
iberici-CNR, 1993: 112-116.
54. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2485, f. 30v.
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than one hundred soldiers.55 At the time, River Cixerri was full of water and easy 
to navigate above all in the final section. In the farmland around Uta, where River 
Manno also joined it, an extremely marshy area was created which was easy to cross 
in small boats suited to goods transport at lower cost and less risk of attack. As the 
journey to Sigerro fort was rather long, those involved in transporting and escorting 
the river journey had to be paid and supplied. In this case, the food for the journey 
consisted of several quintars of rusks kept in sacks and plenty of wine, vinegar and 
oil transported in barrels.56 Sometimes costs increased if it was felt necessary to send 
a number of spies ahead to check the route and report any dangers they found to 
the members of the party preparing to leave.57
The evidence of the account books on the considerable variety of foodstuffs 
supplied to Acquafredda castle shows the extent to which supplies to the castle 
were in line with the popular consumption habits of the day.58 The type of foods 
consumed did not, moreover, change over the course of the batlle general’s three years 
of extraordinary budget and neither did it differ significantly from that generally 
guaranteed as basic supplies to troops stationed in castles or fortified towns under 
siege.
On the contrary, the supplies provided varied according to the availability of 
seasonal produce. Wheat, rice, barley, candi sugar, legumes and cheese, salt, vinegar, 
oil and garlic, salted pork and fish, above all eels, honey, dried fruit and nuts and 
wine —all this made up basic provisions which were never to be absent.59 Wine 
was always Sent Onoxet (Anuxet), a good quality Calabrian wine from San Lucido 
supplied in both blanch and vermell, much appreciated and long-lasting.60
55. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2485, f. 31v. Sent Veneci, also called Santu Venuci or 
Santu Inesu (San Genesio) was a village in the farmland around Uta, now no longer extant. See Asole 
Terrosu, Angela. “L’insediamento umano medioevale e i centri abbandonati fra il secolo XIV e il secolo 
XVII”, Atlante della Sardegna, Roberto Pracchi, Angela Terrosu, eds. Rome: Edizioni Kappa, 1974: 23 (a 
supplement of fascicle II). On the subject of the ancient settlement pattern in Sigerro and studies of the 
positions of abandoned villages, see La curadoria del Sigerro. Vicende attorno al castello di Acquafredda, ed. 
Giovanni Serreli, Simonetta Sitzia, Stefano Castello, Biblioteca Comunale di Siliqua. 10th April 2014 
<http://web.tiscalinet.it/biblsiliqua/curadoria.htm>. 
56. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2485, f. 30v.
57. Cioppi, Alessandra. “I registri...”: 43-60.
58. Ladero, Miguel Ángel. “La alimentación en la España medieval, estado de las investigaciones”. 
Hispania, 45 (1985): 211-220; García, Juan Vicente. “La alimentación en el Medievalismo Valenciano. 
Un tema marginado”. Anales de la Universidad de Alicante. Historia medieval, 8 (1990-1991): 301-322; i 
contributi del volume miscellaneo Alimentació i societat a la Catalunya medieval. Barcelona: Consejo Superior 
de Investigaciones Científicas-Institució Milà i Fontanals, 1988); Montanari, Massimo. L’alimentazione 
contadina nell’alto Medioevo. Naples: Liguori Editore, 1979; Montanari, Massimo. Alimentazione e cultura nel 
medioevo. Milano: Laterza, 1988; Manca, Ciro. Il libro di conti di Miquel Ça-Rovira. Padua: CEDAM, 1969: 
123-130.
59. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2484, ff. 21v-22r; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro 
Racional, reg. 2485, ff. 29v-31; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2486, ff. 29r-30r; ACA. 
Papeles para incorporar, no. 24, ff. 1v-3r; ACA. Cancillería, reg. 1027, ff. 65v-67.
60. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2484, f. 21v; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, 
reg. 2485, f. 30r; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2486, f. 29; ACA. Real Patrimonio. 
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The volume of spare food, on the other hand, varied from year to year in 
accordance with supply difficulties and thus at certain times of year it could be 
subsistence only, a reflection of economic crisis resulting from war, epidemic 
and depopulation. The expenses incurred by the batlle in paying for the produce 
sent to Acquafredda fitted in perfectly with the market fluctuations and financial 
considerations of those years.61
Supplying of the Sigerro fortress also involved a significant quantity of small tools 
and various commonly used everyday materials which were not available at the fort 
itself. Sacks, skins, leather, thread and wax were used for relatively uncomplicated 
repairs while pickaxes, sickles, hatchets, double-bladed axes, bill hooks, wrenches 
and nails in large quantities were useful for every type of work.62
Lastly, various types of water containers, wooden bowls for drinking and plates 
to eat on were also listed63 as were an additional grindstone for milling wheat,64 
sieves to sift the flour,65 a pestle for further grinding the flour and a pastera to use 
for mixing the dough.66 Interesting, in the context of these supplies, is the presence 
of a tablecloth for the dining room and a caldera. The latter was the classic copper, 
semi spherical recipient used to boil water or to cook meat in large quantities.67
Maestro Racional, reg. 2092, ff. 93r-96v; ff. 124r-127r; ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 
2093, f. 45r.
61. Almost all agricultural and animal husbandry products were affected by the production and 
distribution crisis caused by continual warfare. See Manca, Ciro. “Notes sobre l’administració de la 
Sardenya catalana en el segle XIV: l’arrendament de les rendes e drets reyals”. Estudis d’Història Medieval, 
5 (1973): 73-74. On the Cagliari marketplaces, consequently, the prices of other food products such as 
barley, broad beans, cheese, salted meat and olive oil rose at the same rates as wheat. Red wine and 
vinegar prices, of which supplies were satisfactorily ongoing with limited variations thanks to imports 
from Calabria —the well-known red and white wines from San Lucido— and Sicily, were otherwise 
regulated. Sicilia. Manca, Ciro. Il libro di conti...: table 32, 121 and Pinna, Michele. Le Ordinazioni dei 
Consiglieri...: I, chap. 31-32, 24-25; 66, pp. 38-39; II, chap. 27, pp. 108-110; chap. 28, pp. 110-112.
62. The work tools cited in the register comprise both individual tools and those commonly used on 
building sites and the related costs-both relative and absolute-were certainly modest. On this subject, see 
Manca, Ciro. Il libro di conti...: 76.
63. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2485, f. 30r e v. Gavetes were water containers while 
vernigats were bowls. See “gaveta”, Alcover, Antoni Maria; Moll, Francesc de Borja. Diccionari català-
valencià-balear, Palma de Mallorca: Editorial Moll, 1985: VI, 241 (10 vols.) and “vernigat”, Alcover, 
Antoni Maria; Moll, Francesc de Borja. Diccionari català, valencià, balear...: X, 747.
64. This was the sardesco type grindstone discussed earlier used to grind wheat supplies inside the castle. 
See note 45.
65. The sieve used was called a garbell. It was essentially a container with a perforated leather base used 
to separate the wheat from the chaff by beating the wheat with a stick. See ”garbell”, Alcover, Antoni 
Maria; Moll, Francesc de Borja. Diccionari català-valencià-balear...: VI, 183. 
66. ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, reg. 2485, ff. 30-30v. A pastera was a sort of small wooden 
chest on which bread was worked (see “pastera”, Alcover, Antoni Maria; Moll, Francesc de Borja, 
Diccionari català-valencià-balear...: VIII, 312-313). 
67. In our case, the caldera weighed 7 pounds (2.8 kg.). See ACA. Real Patrimonio. Maestro Racional, 
reg. 2486, f. 30 and “caldera”, Alcover, Antoni Maria; Moll, Francesc de Borja, Diccionari català-valencià-
balear...: II, 849-850.
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Lastly, abundant supplies of weaponry to the castle were made up of daggers, 
crossbows and crates full of passadors.68
4. Conclusions
The evidence contained in the batlle general registers confirms the challenging 
nature of the task of supplying and defending surviving Catalan-Aragonese 
strongholds at the turn of the 14th century but also shows just how indispensable 
and strategically important this was to the very survival of the Regnum Sardiniae.
The latter was chosen as a field of study in the light of the Sardinian batlle general 
administration documents but also of the large quantity of sources allowing for 
an adequate assessment of the state of static war as Catalan-Aragonese logistical-
military status quo for the whole century of war of conquest and preservation of the 
island kingdom (1323-1420). It also confirms that this was a defensive instrument 
whose value was comparable to the battlefields themselves or to corsair warfare.
An analytical study of the data in the batlle general account books also allowed for 
a reconstruction of static war organisation and the techniques used in the Sardinian 
kingdom. The administrative management of the capital invested in it and its 
investors were also analysed and, lastly, the impact of this strategy on the island’s 
military vicissitudes was also assessed.
Certainly some of Sardinia’s fortresses played a front rank role historically and 
once they were no longer needed these passed from centrestage to complete neglect. 
This was the fate of Acquafredda castle too. In peacetime, its vassals preferred the 
comfort of the towns to the harsh and solitary life of the fortress. High maintenance 
costs were a serious matter and these, together with the castles’ isolated and 
inaccessible positions, led to their inexorable abandonment leaving them to fall into 
rack and ruin.
68. Passadors were crossbow arrows which Dimitre Virater had bought in Barcelona for 9 lire per thousand 
arrows costing a total of 23 lire and 18 soldi di alfonsini minuti. 15 crates of passadors arrived in Sardinia 
on Francesch Solanis’s ship, which docked at Castell de Càller with all the crown’s supplies for its Regnum 
Sardiniae. On medieval weaponry, see Contamine, Philippe. La guerra nel Medioevo, Tuckery Capra, trad. 
Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986: 247-252; and for Spain: Riquer, Martín de. L’arnès del cavaller. Armes y armadures 
catalanes medievales. Barcelona: Edicions Ariel, 1968; Cirlot, Victoria. El armamento catalán de los siglos XI 
al XIV. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona (PhD Dissertation), 1980: 266-401 (directed by Martí de 
Riquer) and precious arms reproductions.
